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Abstract 
This paper studies the effect of institutions on trade flows, using a gravity model approach. 
Standard gravity equations incorporate factors such as geographical proximity, language, trade 
policy and common history as explanatory factors for variation in bilateral trade that reflect the 
costs of trade across geographical and cultural distance. We extend this type of analysis by 
focusing on the relevance of the quality of governance and the extent of familiarity with the 
resulting framework of rules and norms in explaining variation in bilateral trade patterns. More 
specifically, we test whether institutional homogeneity and institutional quality have an 
independent impact on the trade volume between pairs of countrie . We find that having a similar 
institutional framework promotes bilateral trade by 13%, on average. Furthermore, a better 
quality of formal institutions tends to coincide with more trade. Depending on being either 
importer or exporter, an increase in overall institutional quality of one standard deviation from 
the mean leads to an estimated increase of 30-44% in bilateral trade. 
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1. Introduction 
Recent research in inter ational economics points at the likely relevance of barriers to trade other 
than tariffs and quotas. R uch (2001) focuses on the importance of information costs that are 
related to physical (and cultural) distances. Deardorff (2001) argues that international trade 
patterns to a large extent depend on largely unobservable trading cost, instead of factor 
endowments and technology. On the same note, Anderson (2001) states that informal trade 
barriers appear to be very large even between similar countries, such as the US and Canada. 
Thus, informal trade barriers may help explain the home bias or border effect in trade 
(McCallum, 1995). Also Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000) highlight the possiblerole of unobserved 
trade costs in sorting out some of the apparent puzzles in international economics. 
 The unobserved barriers to trade are often related to incomplete or asymmetric 
information and uncertainty in exchange. North (1990, 1991) argues that, becaus  of imperfect 
insight and incomplete information, people form institutions. He defines institutions as ‘humanly 
devised constraints that shape human interaction’ (1990, p.3). These rules of the game are 
intended to reduce the uncertainty in exchange, and lower transaction costs. The impact of 
institutions on transaction costs has received a lot of attention in the literature on economic 
growth and development (e.g., Hall and Jones, 1999; Olson, 1982, 1996; Knack and Keefer, 
1995). This literature builds on the notion that poor governance entails negative externalities for 
private transactions, and consequently raises transaction costs with negative effects on growth 
and development. We can neatly extend these arguments to international trade (see Wei, 2000). 
Because international transactions involve multiple governance systems, the effectiveness of 
domestic institutions in securing and enforcing property rights in economic exchange is an 
important determinant of trade costs. Furthermore, formal rules affect informal norms of 
behaviour and inter-p sonal trust, which influence the mores and conventions of doing business. 
These, in turn, may also impact on risk perceptions and preferences in international transactions. 
We therefore investigate the hypothesis that institutions matter for international trade.2  
                                           
2 Evidently, the growth and trade lines of research are closely related. Many studies have identified openness to 
international trade as an important determinant of economic growth (e.g., Frankel and Romer, 1999). Thus, even if 
institutions are shown to be of less direct importance for economic performance than trade (cf. Dollar d Kraay, 
2002), a strong link between the quality of governance and trade reconfirms the importance of good governance for 
long-run economic performance. See, for example, Fr nkel and Rose (2002) who use a gravity model approach to 
argue that the main benefits of a currency union for economic performance are related to its positive effect on trade 
and openness, which affect performance beneficially. 
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In order to identify the effects of institutions on bilateral trade, we estimate gravity 
equations. The ‘gravity model’ of bilateral trade is inspired by Newton’s equation of gravity in 
physics, which relates the gravity force with which two bodies attract each other proportionately 
to the product of their masses, and inversely to the square of their distance. Interpreting trade 
between two countries as the economic analogue of the mutual gravitational force between two 
bodies, with their respective GDPs reflecting mass, we see the intuitiv  rationale for a gravity 
model of bilateral trade.3 In general, the gravity model considers trade between a pair of countries 
as an increasing function of their national incomes and a decreasing function of their 
geographical distance (Frankel and Rose, 2002). Other variables that relate to both countries, or 
either of the two countries separately, may also enter into the equation (population size, land area, 
contiguity, etc.). The model has performed well empirically. Amongst others, studies by Helpman 
and Krugman (1985) and Deardorff (1998) show that both new trade theories of product 
differentiation as well as the classical Heckscher-Ohlin theory of comparative advantage can 
provide a theoretical rationale for th  gravity model of bilateral trade. 
 Compared to the literature on institutions and growth, the impact of institutions on 
international trade flows has received relatively little attention.4 Two rece t empirical studies 
have considered the impact of institut ons on trade (Anderson and Marcouiller, 2002, and 
Koukhartchouk and Maurel, 2003) in a gravity model context. Anderson and Marcouiller have 
been amongst the main contributors to extend institutional analysis of the economy explicitly to 
the field of international trade. Their most recent contribution combines the analysis of the effects 
of institutions in a theoretical model with empirical estimates of the impact of institutional 
effectiveness on trade. Koukhartchouk and Maurel (2003) analyse the effects of joining 
international institutions such as the WTO and the EU on trade patterns. They introduce variables 
reflecting institutional quality into the analysis of potential trade effects for Central and Eastern 
European countries. 
Our paper intends to contribute to this virgin literature in two ways. First, we have used 
the most recent and comprehensive data-set on he quality of governance available. This database 
                                           
3 The analogy doesn’t entirely follow suit. While the resulting force with which either of the two particles attracts the 
other is equal (irrespective of their individual mass), trade from one country to the other may in general be different 
from its counterpart. 
4 Anderson (2001) and Den Butter and Mosch (2002) are examples in the literature that focus on the effects of 
informal institutions on trade. 
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was constructed for the World Bank by Kaufmann et al. (2002). Indicators from 17 different 
sources, constructed by 15 organisations have been combined, including the sources used by 
Anderson and Marcouiller (World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report) and 
Koukhartchouk and Maurel (Heritage Foundation, Economic Freedom Index). Second, we intend 
to analyse not only the effect of institutional quality on trade, but also the effect of similarity in 
governance quality. In this way, we capture both the country-sp cific effect of good governance 
on trade, and the bilateral influence of institutional distance on patterns of trade. We expect that 
institutional homogeneity results in similar, hence familiar, informal business procedures, which 
may reduce transaction costs. 
We proceed as follows. Section 2 discusses the measures of institutional quality that we 
have used in the analysis. In sections 3 and 4, we present and discuss the regression results for 
alternative specifications of a basic and extended gravity model, respectively. Section 5 
concludes. 
 
 
2. Data description and model setup 
In the empirical analysis that follows, we make use of both country-specific and bilateral data 
from various sources. Gross domestic product for exporting and importing countries are examples 
of country-specific variables that we include in the analysis. Geographical distance, adjacency, 
main language and religion, amongst others, are examples of other characteristics that we take 
into account for each pair of countries. We focus on trade patterns in 1998, for a set of more than 
100 countries. We use bilateral exports as dependent variable, such that each country pair yields 
two observations, with each country either as exporter or importer. Since these variables are more 
or less standard in the literature, we do not extensively discuss them here. Appendix A further 
describes these data and their sources.  
Since the main emphasis in this paper is on the effects of institutions, we take a closer 
look at the institutional variables. We have used the database constructed by Kaufmann et al.
(2002). They have constructed six indicators of perceived institutional quality. Each indic tor 
captures some related aspects of the quality of governance. They either reflect the political 
process, the quality of the state apparatus and its policies, or the success of governance. We 
discuss these indicators in turn. 
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1. ‘Voice and Accountability’ reflects the extent to which citizens can participate in 
selecting government and hold her accountable for the actions taken. This score includes 
various characteristics of the political process as well as assessments of the independence 
of the media. It reflects whether citizens and business can prevent arbitrariness in the 
behaviour of government and enforce good governance when needed. 
2. ‘Political Stability’ refers to the perceived likelihood of the government being destabilised 
or overthrown byunconstitutional interference or excesses of violence against persons 
and possessions. These factors are highly detrimental for the continuity of policy and the 
stability of the economic environment.  
3. ‘Government Effectiveness’ is a measure for the quality of government inputs. It 
represents, amongst others, the perceived quality and independence of the bureaucracy. 
This indicates the ability of government to formulate and implement good policies. 
4. ‘Regulatory Quality’ is directly focused on the quality of implemented policies. It 
includes the perceived incidence of policies that inhibit the market mechanism, and 
excessive regulation of foreign trade and business development and as such closely 
reflects the transaction costs that result from policy intrusion by the state in private trade. 
5. ‘Rule of Law’ indicates the quality of the legal system. It indicates society’s perceived 
success in upholding fair and predictable rules for social and economic interaction. 
Essentially, it focuses on the quality of the legal system and the enforceability of 
contracts. 
6. ‘Control of Corruption’ represents the extent of ‘lawless’ or unfair behaviour in public-
private interactions. It complements regulatory quality and rule of law indicators, pointing 
at the impact of bad governance on economic interaction. Corruption, like regulatory 
intrusion, affects transaction costs by adding a ‘third-party’ involvement to private 
transaction. An added component of corruption to trading costs is its arbitrary, uncertain 
nature. 
 
Table 1 below illustrates the data on institutional quality. It presents the sample means and 
standard deviations for each of these indicators, together with some tentative illustration of the 
corresponding cross-country differences in institutional quality. 
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Table 1. Some data on governance as illustration: countries at various levels of quality 
Governance Quality Voice and 
accountability 
Political 
Stability 
Government 
Effectiveness 
Regulatory 
Quality 
Rule of Law Control of 
Corruption 
One s.d. above mean Spain France Hong Kong Uruguay Spain Slovenia 
Mean Governance Slovenia Morocco China Brunei Tanzania Jordan 
One s.d. below mean Azerbaijan Benin Yemen Burundi Azerbaijan Tanzania 
Mean 
(s.d.) 
0.22 
(0.92) 
0.15 
(0.88) 
0.14 
(0.92) 
0.18 
(0.79) 
0.16 
(0.95) 
0.09 
(1.00) 
Note: All indicator scores have been scaled from –2.5 t  +2.5 (see Kaufmann et al., 2002)  The selected countries 
have a minimum distance to the mean and the score of one s.d. above and below average, respectively. 
 
To capture similarity in institutional quality, we have constructed dummy variables for the 
various dimensions of governance that we introduced before. If the difference in institutional 
effectiveness (positively defined) between two countries in a country-pair exceeds (is below) a 
specified fraction of the sample standard deviation of the specific indicator of effectiveness, the 
countries are viewed as heterogeneous (homogeneous) in terms of the quality of governance. In 
such a case, the country-pai  scores a value of zero (one) on the governance similarity dummy. 
The estimated effect of institutional homogeneity on trade, measured in this way as a discrete 
impact, is clear and concise in its interpretation.5  
All aspects of governance are interrelated. As a result, the indicators are highly positively 
correlated. For that reason, we treat them separately in the empirical analysis, including one 
dimension of governance in the equation at a time. Adding too many at once results in serious 
problems of multi-collinearity. We will also use a composite indicator of institutional quality, to 
capture the overall quality of governance in a country. The simple arithmetic average of the 
scores on each separate indicator serves as a composite indicator that reflects overall quality of 
governance. 
  
                                           
5 Alternatively, we could have specified a non-linear function of the absolute value of the difference in institutional 
quality. In this way, we would have an index of heterogeneity on a continuous scale. The interpretation of the size of 
the effect would be more difficult though. To account for the sensitivity of our dummy variable specification, we 
address the results for several similarity criteria. 
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A typical gravity equation that we estimate below looks as follows: 
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where i and j denote the exporting and importing country. The dependent variable Tij is aggregate 
merchandise exports from i t  j for 1998. The independent variables are, respectively: national 
income (Y), income per capita (y), the distance between i and j (Dij), dummies reflecting whether 
i and j share: a land border (Adj), their primary language (Lang), membership in a regional 
Preferential Trade Agreement (PTA), their main religion (Religion), and whether they were part 
of a common colonial empire (Col). The variables of particular interest in this paper are, 
respectively, the level of subjective institutional quality (Inst), nd a dummy reflecting whether 
both countries have a similar quality of institutions (SimInst). The last term is the stochasti  error 
term, which captures all other (omitted) effects on trade and is assumed to be well-behaved. The 
gravity model estimates are acquired using OLS. 
 
 
3. Basic Results 
Before investigating the effects of institutions, we first discuss a set of specifications of the 
gravity equation that take into account standard variables often applied in the literature. The 
results are contained in Table 2. In the first specification, we regress bilateral trade on the levels 
of gross domestic product in the exporting and importing country. This specification of the 
gravity model corresponds to basic new trade theory models, in which trade is positively related 
to market size. In accordance with other gravity model studies of bilateral trade, we find that 
GDP positively and significantly affects trade. This confirms theoretical expectations. Since we 
focus on exports rather than total bilateral trade, we can also examine whether the effect of GDP 
on trade differs between the country of origin and the country of destination trade flows. The 
results indicate that export supply is income elastic: a 1% increase in exporter GDP raises 
bilateral trade on average by about 1.2 %, while trade is inelastic with respect to importer GDP, 
with an estimated elasticity of 0.86. The importance of GDP variation in accounting for the 
variation in trade is illustrated by the fact that about half of the variation in bilateral trade flows is 
explained by variation in GDP.
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Table 2. Standard gravity equations; dependent variable: log total bilateral export 
 Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 3 Specification 4 Specification 5a)
Log GDP exporter  1.19 1.26 1.20 1.18  
 (89.25) (106.41) (81.24) (81.05)  
Log GDP importer  0.86 0.90 0.86 0.85  
 (69.07) (81.48) (59.80) (59.32)  
Log GDP per capita exporter   0.15 0.20  
   (5.31) (7.23)  
Log GDP per capita importer   0.11 0.15  
   (4.03) (5.72)  
Log Distance  -1.34 -1.30 -1.15 -0.89 
  (-51.95) (-50.24) (-42.30) (-31.74) 
Border Dummy    0.67 1.09 
    (4.80) (8.57) 
Language Dummy    0.19 0.58 
    (1.75) (5.48) 
Trade area Dummy    0.87 1.00 
    (10.19) (11.28) 
Religion Dummy    0.45 0.75 
    (8.39) (14.53) 
Colonial Dummy    0.68 0.65 
    (7.46) (7.00) 
adj.R2 0.53 0.64 0.65 0.66 0.72 
number of obs. 9554.00 9554.00 9006.00 9006.00 9652.00 
F-statistic 5444.81 5554.86 3296.67 1782.42 - 
Note:  t-statistics are reported in parentheses in the line below the parameter estimates. Constant terms, where applicable, are not 
shown in the table; a) country-dummy coefficients not reported.  
 
The second specification adds geographical distance as an explanatory variable of bilateral trade. 
Distance serves as a proxy for the size of transportation costs and also reflects other distance 
related trade costs. This specification includes the relevant variables that feature in basic new 
economic geography models (see Fujita et al., 1999). Distance negatively affects the intensity of 
trade. According to our estimates, a 1% increase in bilateral distance reduces trade more than 
proportionately. The effect of distance is highly significant. The result supports the importance of 
trade costs for explaining the patterns of trade. After including the basic gravity variables 
(income and distance), more than 60% of the variation in trade is accounted for. 
Standard gravity models also control for other country-specific and bilateral 
characteristics that may affect trade. The third model included in Table 2 allows for an effect of 
the level of development on trade. Trade is estimated to increase with the level of incom  per 
capita in both countries. These coefficients are statistically significant at the 1% level. This 
finding has also been reported frequently in other gravity studies (e.g., Frankel, 1997, 1998), but 
is not undisputed. Trade theories do not pr vide a clear explanation for the positive effect of per 
capita income. As it is, the estimates confirm the observation by Deardorff (1998, p. 16) that 
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‘high-income countries trade disproportionately more (..) with all trading partners and not just 
among themselves, while low-income countries trade less’. Adding income per capita to the 
gravity equation decreases the coefficients for the GDP variables somewhat to separate the 
effects of economic size and economic development. 
The fourth specification extends the model with several variables that have proven to be 
effective controls for shared historical, political and cultural background (see Frankel, 1997).6 
The dummy variables indicate the presence of a common language, common dominant religion 
and common colonial history. Furthermore, we control for the effect of economic integration 
using a dummy variable for common membership in regional trading blocs. Measurement errors 
in the distance variable, s well as the effect of historical relations between adjacent countries are 
captured by the dummy for common land border. The results show that all variables have the 
expected positive sign as is often reported in the literature, and are significant at the 10% level at 
least. 
The coefficients on GDP and income per capita are quite robust to these extensions. As 
expected, the estimated impact of distance on trade (positively defined) declines somewhat. Most 
relations represented in the bilateral dummy variables more or less cluster in space. Thus, adding 
these variables arguably corrects for an upward omitted variables bias in the estimated impact of 
distance on trade. 
We may still wonder whether the coefficients on the bilateral dummies themselves suffer 
from the effects of omitted country-specific variables. The results for a regression equation that 
includes country-specific dummies for each country, both as exporter and importer, are presented 
in the last column of Table 2. The model is estimated with a full set of dummies, omitting one 
dummy and the consta t term. The dummy variables represent all country-spe ific factors that 
might be relevant for their propensity to trade, either in the role as exporter or as importing 
country. The resulting parameter estimates for bilateral variables generally become more precise 
and do not suffer from omitted variable biases. 
                                           
6  The rationale for the extended model is not so much that it increases the share of explained variation in trade flows 
(the adjusted R2 rises only slightly). It is by no means an uncommon finding that the proportion of the variance in 
trade flows explained by the gravity model does not rise substantially after the basic gravity variables have been 
accounted for. The bilateral dummies in Specification 4 correct for the effects of various unobserved trade costs on 
bilateral trade, that would otherwise bias the estimates on the basic gravity variables. 
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Following the introduction of country-specific dummies, the coefficients on the bilateral 
dummy variables rise, and they become statistically more significant. However, country-specific 
fixed effects lower the impact of distance and its statistical significance. Despite the quantitative 
changes in the estimates, the qualitative effects do not change in comparison to the standard 
gravity model as represented in Specification 4.  
 
 
4. The Role of Institutions 
In this section we extend the analysis in the previous section and focus on the explanatory role of 
institutional quality and institutional homogeneity for the intensity of bilateral trade. The 
economic rationale for including these variables is s mple. A better quality of the institutional 
framework reduces uncertainty about contract enforcement and general economic governance. 
This reduces transaction costs directly, by increasing the security of property, as well as 
indirectly, by increasing the level of trust in the process of economic transactions. Homoge eity 
in the perceived quality of institutions (cf. Beugelsdijk and van Schaik, 2001) may give rise to 
similar norms of behaviour (conventions, business practices) and similar levels of trust in doing 
business. Institutional homogeneity l ads to familiarity with each others formal procedures and 
with the informal conventions and habits developed to deal with the governance situation. If 
traders in both countries experience similar levels of institutional effectiveness, they are better 
equipped to use each other’s institutions, to operate in each other’s institutional environment. 
This reduces adjustment costs that have to be made because of natural unfamiliarity with 
international trading partners, and lowers the insecurity related to transaction c ntingencies in 
trade. Similarity of informal business procedures may increase bilateral trust. Economic agents in 
similar institutional environments have more confidence in being compatible trading partners, 
compared to the traders from two institutio ally heterogeneous countries.7 
Our reasoning logically relates to the argument in Anderson and Marcouiller (2002, pp. 
343-344), who state that insecurity of international transactions influences trade by imposing a 
price mark-up on traded goods. This price mark-up depends on two factors. The quality of 
                                           
7 Similarity of informal norms resulting from a similar experience with formal governance is an important potential 
factor of cultural familiarity. Language, religion and other historical ties are other factors that have received earlier 
attention in the literature. The general argument of ‘cultural familiarity’, or ‘psychic distance’, goes back to 
Linnemann (1966) and others (cited in Frankel, 1997). 
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institutions determines their effectiveness in protecting and enabling private transactions. 
However, the bilateral familiarity of trading partners is important as well. This determines how 
‘skillfully’ traders can use each other’s institutional capacity. Anderson and Marcouiller refer to 
the instrumental roles that can be played in this matter by language commonality and contiguity. 
They also justify the relative insecurity mark-up on traded goods as compared to domestic goods 
by arguing that transaction costs in domestic trade are lower because of the greater availability of 
informal procedures to protect property rights. We argue that institutional homogeneity is an 
additional factor determining relative transaction costs and price mark-ups in bilateral trade. 
 
 
4.1 The effects of institutional quality
Table 3 presents the results for a gravity model supplemented with institutional quality. Each 
specification includes an indicator for the perceived quality of a country’s institutional 
framework. The variable relevant for each specification is given in the column headings. Across 
the board, the impact of a higher perceived quality of governance on bilateral trade is positive and 
highly statistically significant, independent of which indicator of quality is used in the 
estimations. Because the indicators of institutional quality vary between –2.5 to +2.5, we cannot 
log-linearize the relation between institutions and trade. The relation necessarily is of a semi-log 
form. The effect sizes reported are semi-ela ticities. To interpret the substantive impact suggested 
by these effect sizes, we start from the standard deviation of these variables within the sample. 
The effect on trade of a difference of one standard deviation from the average institutional quality 
gives a good indication of the average impact of variation in institutional quality on trade flows. 
Table 1 illustrated the sample means and standard deviations of the indicators for institutional 
quality. 
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Table 3. Extended gravity equations: institutional quality; dependent variable: log total bilateral export 
 Voice and 
accountability 
Political 
Stability 
Government 
Effectiveness 
Regulatory 
Quality 
Rule of Law Control of 
Corruption 
Composite 
Indicator 
Log GDP exporter 1.20 1.19 1.18 1.19 1.19 1.19 1.19 
 (82.31) (80.21) (80.19) (80.41) (80.47) (80.57) (80.92) 
Log GDP importer 0.85 0.85 0.84 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.86 
 (60.03) (57.74) (57.65) (57.97) (57.67) (57.85) (58.19) 
Log GDP per capita exporter -0.05 0.05 -0.05 0.10 -0.06 -0.04 -0.09 
 (-1.48) (1.32) (-1.18) (2.93) (-1.38) (-0.97) (-2.04) 
Log GDP per capita importer 0.07 0.00 -0.02 0.01 0.04 0.02 -0.05 
 (1.95) (-0.06) (-0.55) (0.30) (1.07) (0.48) (-1.25) 
Log Distance -1.15 -1.16 -1.16 -1.19 -1.15 -1.17 -1.18 
 (-42.47) (-42.89) (-43.03) (-43.42) (-42.56) (-43.15) (-43.53) 
Border Dummy 0.70 0.66 0.71 0.65 0.70 0.66 0.66 
 (5.04) (4.73) (5.11) (4.72) (5.03) (4.72) (4.72) 
Language Dummy 0.12 0.20 0.26 0.21 0.28 0.24 0.21 
 (1.12) (1.80) (2.42) (1.96) (2.58) (2.18) (1.95) 
Trade area Dummy 0.89 0.88 0.84 0.84 0.85 0.86 0.85 
 (10.50) (10.27) (9.79) (9.82) (9.89) (10.04) (9.95) 
Religion Dummy 0.47 0.47 0.49 0.45 0.49 0.48 0.49 
 (8.77) (8.70) (9.04) (8.40) (9.15) (8.89) (9.06) 
Colonial Dummy 0.69 0.65 0.53 0.55 0.56 0.56 0.55 
 (7.67) (7.14) (5.81) (6.07) (6.20) (6.15) (6.10) 
Governance exporter 0.37 0.21 0.34 0.19 0.33 0.29 0.43 
 (10.45) (4.69) (7.70) (4.34) (7.60) (7.43) (8.30) 
Governance importer 0.13 0.23 0.26 0.29 0.15 0.17 0.31 
 (3.86) (5.43) (5.87) (7.19) (3.53) (4.28) (6.11) 
adj.R2 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 
number of obs. 9006.00 8834.00 8834.00 8834.00 8834.00 8715.00 8715.00 
F-statistic 1515.69 1469.26 1479.88 1473.76 1473.92 1473.45 1481.48 
Note:  t-statistics are reported in parentheses in the line below the parameter estimates. Const nt terms are not shown in the table. 
 
Although differing between indicators and according to the country’s role as exporter or 
importer, the impact of variation in the quality of institutions on trade is substantial. An increase 
in regulatory quality of one standard deviation from the mean leads to an estimated increase of 
16-26% in trade.8 Lower corruption, on average, accounts for 19-34% extra trade.9 Using the 
composite indicator of governance quality (last column), we gain insight in the overall trade 
impact of variation in governance effectiveness.10 Incr a ing the overall quality of institutions 
one standard deviation above its mean level would raise bilateral exports by 44%, and bilateral 
imports by 30%. These effects of governance on trade intensity are substantial. 
                                           
8 The mean score for regulatory quality is 0.18, with a standard deviation of 0.79. For an exporting country (a semi-
elasticity of 0.19), the average trade increase figure is computed as follows:  
( ) %1616.0179.019.0)ln( 79.019.0 ==-=´= ´e
T
dT
Td
ij
ij
ij so . 
9 This confirms the finding by Tamirisa and Wei (2002) that corruption is an important informal barrier to trade. 
10 The average overall quality of governance in the sample is 0.16, with a standard deviation of 0.84. 
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Apparently, trade costs associated with the effectiveness of institutions seriously affect 
the distribution and size of bilateral trade flows. Yet, the introduction of institutional quality in 
the gravity equation does not substantially increase the explained share of variation in trade 
flows, or noticeably affect the coefficients on the bilateral variables and GDP. Omitted variable 
bias turns out to be an essential element in interpreting th  g avity model with institutions. After 
institutions have been included in the gravity model, the clearly positive effect of income per 
capita levels on trade disappears. The result is most pronounced for the specification that uses the 
average index of institutional quality. The effect of the level of development on trade becomes 
insignificant and negative for the import side, and even significantly negative for the export side. 
This result confirms the findings in Anderson and Marcouiller (2002), and makes clear that the 
standard gravity model including income per capita as explanatory variable suffers from severe 
omitted variable bias, if institutions are not taken into account. Stated alternatively, institutional 
quality helps opening up the black box that is created by the inclusion of GDP per capita. 
On the basis of these findings, we can conclude that institutions are dominant in 
explaining why rich countries trade more in general, and more so amongst each other, while poor 
countries trade less amongst themselves. Kaufmann et al. (2002, p. 4) already note the ‘strong 
positive association across countries between governance and per capita incomes’. High-income 
countries support high quality institutional systems that reduce transaction costs. Hence, a 
possible solution for the missing theoretical explanation why rich countries trade more has been 
found. 
 
 
4.2 The effects of institutional homogeneity 
Table 4 concentrates on gravity models extended with variables to reflect the effect of 
institutional similarity. We focus on the composite indicator of governance quality, and discuss 
different models depending on the selection criteria of classifying countries as similar in terms of 
institutional effectiveness. The general qualitative pattern in the effect of similarity across various 
assumptions is almost entirely replicated for the separate indicators individually (results are 
available upon request). 
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Table 4. Extended gravity equations: institutional homogeneity; dependent variable: log total bilateral export 
 Composite index, homogeneous if absolute difference in institutional quality is: 
 < 1 standard 
deviation 
< 2 standard 
deviations 
< 3 standard 
deviations 
< 1 standard 
deviations 
<2 standard 
deviationsa) 
Log GDP exporter 1.18 1.18 1.18   
 (79.93) (79.97) (79.98)   
Log GDP importer 0.85 0.85 0.85   
 (57.48) (57.58) (57.58)   
Log GDP per capita exporter 0.20 0.21 0.21   
 (7.39) (7.55) (7.60)   
Log GDP per capita importer 0.15 0.15 0.15   
 (5.71) (5.66) (5.58)   
Log Distance -1.17 -1.17 -1.17 -0.88 -0.88 
 (-42.94) (-42.80) (-42.94) (-31.31) (-31.36) 
Border Dummy 0.62 0.60 0.60 1.08 1.05 
 (4.43) (4.28) (4.33) (8.44) (8.24) 
Language Dummy 0.19 0.19 0.18 0.59 0.58 
 (1.71) (1.70) (1.64) (5.50) (5.49) 
Trade area Dummy 0.89 0.87 0.87 0.95 0.90 
 (10.27) (10.04) (10.12) (10.52) (9.94) 
Religion Dummy 0.47 0.46 0.47 0.79 0.78 
 (8.61) (8.54) (8.64) (15.27) (14.96) 
Colonial Dummy 0.64 0.64 0.65 0.62 0.61 
 (7.10) (7.09) (7.16) (6.66) (6.58) 
Governance similarity -0.05 0.12 0.49 -0.03 0.27 
 (-1.13) (2.03) (2.75) (-0.59) (4.25) 
adj R2 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.72 0.72 
number of obs. 8715.00 8715.00 8715.00 9234 9234 
F-statistic 1587.92 1588.70 1589.64 - - 
Note:  t-statistics are reported in parentheses in the line below the parameter estimates. Constant terms, where applicable, are not 
shown in the table; a) country-dummy coefficients not reported.  
 
In section 2, we have explained how we constructed the dummy variable for institutional 
similarity. If the absolute difference in institutional effectiveness b twe  the exporting and 
importing country does not exceed a specified fraction of the sample standard deviation in the 
relevant index of governance, the quality of governance is regarded as similar in both countries. 
The first three columns present models in which we vary only the specified fraction. In the first 
column, each difference below one standard deviation is associated with institutional 
homogeneity. The other columns use 2 and 3 standard deviations respectively. Columns 4 and 5 
check for the importance of omitted country-specific variables for the parameter estimates of 
similarity. They present models with a fully specified set of country-specific fixed effects, using 
similarity dummies based on the one or two standard deviation criterions. 
The effect of similarity in institutional effectiveness on trade appears to depend on how 
inclusive the set of ‘similar’ countries is. With one standard deviation as the criterion, 50% of the 
countries classify as homogeneous in terms of governance effectiveness. Th  effect of similarity 
in this case is not significant and appears to be negative. The effect is rather small: having a 
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similar institutional framework appears to lower trade by 5%. If we relax the cut-off criterion to 
two or three standard deviations, the fraction of  ‘similar’ countries increases first to 83% and 
then to 98%. In effect, this means that only countries that differ very widely in terms of 
institutional quality are seen as dissimilar. The trade effect of similarity becomes substantially 
positive and significant. For a cut-off criterion of two standard deviations, similarity raises trade 
by an estimated 13%. 
 
Table 5. Extended gravity equations: institutional quality and homogeneity; dependent variable: log total 
bilateral export 
 Composite index, homogeneous if absolute difference in institutional quality is: 
 < 1 standard deviation < 2 standard deviations < 3 standard deviations  
Log GDP exporter 1.19 1.20 1.19 
 (80.91) (80.99) (80.96) 
Log GDP importer 0.86 0.86 0.86 
 (58.14) (58.27) (58.20) 
Log GDP per capita exporter -0.09 -0.10 -0.09 
 (-2.04) (-2.15) (-2.04) 
Log GDP per capita importer -0.05 -0.06 -0.05 
 (-1.26) (-1.31) (-1.16) 
Log Distance -1.18 -1.18 -1.18 
 (-43.53) (-43.39) (-43.53) 
Border Dummy 0.66 0.64 0.65 
 (4.76) (4.61) (4.69) 
Language Dummy 0.21 0.21 0.21 
 (1.95) (1.94) (1.88) 
Trade area Dummy 0.86 0.84 0.85 
 (9.97) (9.74) (9.87) 
Religion Dummy 0.49 0.49 0.49 
 (9.08) (9.02) (9.11) 
Colonial Dummy 0.55 0.55 0.56 
 (6.10) (6.06) (6.16) 
Governance exporter 0.43 0.44 0.43 
 (8.25) (8.48) (8.36) 
Governance importer 0.31 0.31 0.29 
 (6.11) (6.11) (5.87) 
Governance similarity -0.03 0.15 0.43 
 (-0.66) (2.69) (2.46) 
adj R2 0.67 0.67 0.67 
number of obs. 8715.00 8715.00 8715.00 
F-statistic 1367.46 1369.06 1368.78 
Note:  t-statistics are reported in parentheses in the line below the parameter estimates. Constant terms are not shown in the table. 
 
In Table 5, the specifications for different similarity definitions are estimated when controlling 
for the level of institutional quality in both countries. Indeed, institutional similarity and 
institutional quality have separate effects. Differences in institutional effectiveness affect trade, 
independently of the impact of governance effectiveness itself. It appears that controlling for the 
level of quality corrects for an omitted variable bias on the effect of similarity as defined in the 
first specification of Table 4. The effect of similarity in the specification using country dummies 
Bilateral Trade Flows and Institutions 15
(column 4, Table 4) is very similar to the effect in the first specification of Table 5. The negative 
effect of income per capita shows up again after we have controlled for institutional quality as 
well (compare with Table 4). Moreover, when accounting for the effect of institutional similarity, 
the impact of institutional quality remains highly significant and positive.  
To conclude, the impact of similarity on trade becomes substantially and significantly 
positive if we classify sufficient countries as similar in terms of institutional effec veness.
Alternatively, differences in institutional quality only start to have independent negative effects 
on trade, when the difference becomes really large. Then, unfamiliarity adds an extra dimension 
to the transaction costs of bilateral trade. Adjustment costs, and additional lack of trust and 
confidence in the security of transactions begin to accumulate when differences in the 
institutional environment between exporters and importers increase. When the impact of 
governance quality is taken into consideration, similarity raises trade by an estimated 16% in the 
middle scenario of Table 5. 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
Recent research draws attention to the importance of informal barriers to international trade, 
caused by intangible factors. The institutional framework is an important element in explaining 
the size of transaction costs. This paper has therefore explicitly investigated the effect of 
institutions on the patterns of bilateral trade. It starts from the argument that the quality of formal 
rules that govern economic interaction is an important determinant of the uncertainty and 
opportunism in market exchange. A low quality of governance increases the transaction costs that 
are incurred in exchange. The impact of institutions on private trade and investment is argued o 
be at least as important in international exchange as in domestic transactions. Moreover, the 
quality of formal rules affects the informal norms and procedures of doing business that are 
devised to cope with transactional uncertainty. This creates the possibility that countries with 
similar levels of institutional quality may be familiar with each others business practices. This 
reduces transaction costs. 
We find that institutional quality has a significant, positive and substantial impact on 
bilateral trade flows. The same goes for similar quality of governance. These results support the 
hypothesis that institutional variation is an important determinant of informal barriers to trade. 
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The positive correlation between income per capita and the quality of institutions gives rise to an 
explanation of why high-income countries trade disproportionately amongst each other, while the 
same does not hold for low-income countries. Generally good governance lowers transaction 
costs for trade between high-income countries, while trade between low-income countries suffers 
from high insecurity and transaction costs.  
An important implication emerges from our separate focus on country-specific quality of 
institutions and bilateral homogeneity of governance. We show that large divergence in the 
effectiveness of institutions independently reduces trade. This reflects the adjustment costs and 
extra uncertainty involved when traders do not share a sufficiently effective institutional 
framework. Institutional dissimilarity affects trade between countries with the best institutional 
quality and those that have the lowest effectiveness. Potential trade between these countries is 
diverted to partners closer in terms of institutional effectiveness. The impact of trade diversion is 
likely to be most severe for low security countries. Countries with poor formal institutions, apart 
from the negative effect of bad governance on their mutual trade, somewhat bounce back into 
trade with similar countries. Thus, they cannot benefit as much from trade with highly developed 
countries, despite the potential comparative advantages, knowledge spillovers, and large sales 
markets. These countries may become locked into a situation of low economic performance. This 
provides an additional argument for serious policy concern with the international promotion of 
good governance. 
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Appendix A. Description of data  
This appendix contains information on the data used in the analysis. First, a description of the 
variables used in the analysis is presented, as well as a description of their sources. Subsequently, 
we provide a concise overview of these variables and the abbreviations we assigned to them in 
our database. Our dataset comprised the countries that have been included in Kaufmann et al. 
(2001). In each estimated regression equation, we included those countries for which data on 
relevant indicators could be found or constructed. The starting point for the data set was that the 
countries included in the analysis should have data available on the relevant bilateral trade flows 
and on some of the institutional indicators. They should be included in both the WITS database 
and the database on governance indicators (see below). 
 
Description of the data sources and the relevant variables 
For our analysis, we used data on bilateral trade for 1998 from the WITS database, accessed on 
courtesy of the Worldbank. The WITS includes various datasets on trade. We have used UN data 
on exports between pairs of countries. The figures focus on merchandise trade only. The WITS 
allows us to analyse trade patterns on both the aggregate and sector level, the latter in 
concordance with 1-digit SITC. For now, the analysis has focused on aggregate trade flows. 
 For information on the level of GDP and GDP per capita, data from the World 
Development Indicators (Worldbank 2000, on CD Rom) were used for 1998. 
 The data for institutional qu lity were taken from Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobatón 
(2002), which we also used to construct figures for the bilateral variables reflecting institutional 
homogeneity. A further description of the institutional variables has been included in the main 
text. We refer the reader to section 2 for this purpose. 
 The analysis also includes other bilateral variables: geographical distance, common 
border, common primary language, common trade agreement, common dominant religion and 
common colonial history. These have been collected from diverse sources, such as Sala-i-Martin 
(1997) for religions and colonial backgrounds. This database is available upon request from the 
corresponding author. 
 As conventional in the literature, geographical distance has been measured as the distance 
from home to foreign ‘as the bird flies’, using the principal city of each country as its centre of 
gravity. This implies that the distance between the two centres of gravity of neighbouring 
countries overestimates the average distance of tr de between them. The argument that the 
distance measure used leads to an overestimate of the distance of trading holds true for all pairs 
of countries. However, its relative impact is much larger in neighbouring countries than in 
countries that are fa away from each other. Distance is related to the costs of physical transport 
of goods and persons, an important part of trading costs. Not all countries in our dataset were 
represented in the database for bilateral distances. For these countries, proxies were const uct d 
using distances from neighbouring countries that were included in the database. For more 
discussion of the use and usefulness of other, more sophisticated measures of geographical 
distance, see Frankel (1997, chapter 4). In general, more sophisticated measures do not change 
the estimation results much, and cannot eliminate the measurement error for contiguous countries 
either. 
 Common border is a dummy variable that indicates whether two countries are adjacent. 
As argued in the main text, this may independently promote bilateral trade. For countries in our 
data set that had no adjacency data available from the main source, the CIA factbook 
(www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook) was used to determine whether they shared borders with 
any other country in the data set. 
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 To assess commonality in primary language, we used a database that distinguished 
fourteen languages: Arabic, Burmese, Chinese, Dutch, English, French, German, Greek, Korean, 
Malay, Persian, Portuguese, Spanish and Swedish. In case none of these applied or no data were 
available, the categories ‘other language’ and ‘non available’ were assigned. Using the CIA 
factbook, these countries have been checked. A dummy variable reflects whether or not two 
countries have the same primary language, an important aspect of cultural similarity. 
 Whether pairs of countries take part in common trade agreements has been assessed using 
WTO data on major regional integration agreements. A dummy variable (common trade block) 
indicates whether a pair of countries enters into at least one common trade block.
 Cultural and/or historical ties between countries may also consist of a common dominant 
religion or a shared colonial past. Data for religion and colonial background have been taken 
from Sala-i-Martin (1997). Percentages of the population that adhere to one of seven major 
religions are presented. These religions are: Buddhism, Catholicism, Confucianism, Hinduism, 
Jewish religion, Islam, and Protestantism. For some countries, two religions were equally 
dominant over the others. These countries entered into the analysis with both religions as 
dominant religion. Commonality of dominant religion implies a value of 1 for the dummy 
variable ‘common religion’. 
 The dummy variable ‘common colony’ reflects for each pair of countries whether both of 
them share a similar colonial history. The data considered the British, French and Spanish 
empires only. We also included the colonizers themselves into the respective empires, contrary to 
the original source. In this way, the figures identify shared colonial relations for pairs of 
countries. 
